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MALTHUSIAN THINKING AMONG

FOREIGNERS AND

NEPALIS IN NEPAL

As a historian of Malthusian thinking in the
twentieth century, I'm always curious to see when and
how arguments about overpopulation are deployed
in contemporary contexts. Recently, two Malthusian
arguments about Nepal caught my attention.
The
first, coming from an American environmentalist,
did not surprise me that much. The second-from
Nepali friends of mine who live in a village I've
worked in for some time-did.
These Malthusian
arguments provide a window onto an approach to
understanding Nepal that dominated development
circles during the 1970s and 1980s-and,
indeed,
onto the mentality against which the Annapurna
Conservation Area Project, the subject of the other
two papers of this panel, developed in the 1980s.
While reading a 2003 article in Harper's, I came
across an article by Jared Diamond, the UCLA
geographer who is well known for Guns, Germs,
and Steel and the more recent Collapse: How
Societies Choose to Failor Succeed. In the article,
trying to refute the idea that environmentalists
are
"fear-mongering,
overreacting
extremists
whose
predictions of impending disaster have been proved
wrong," Diamond asks readers to compare two
lists-a
list of countries "where state government
has already been overwhelmed and has collapsed,
or is now at risk of collapsing, or has been wracked
by recent civil wars" and a list of countries "faCing
some of the worst problems of environmental
stress, overpopulation, or both." You might guess
where this is going: Nepal is on both lists. The
implication is that Nepal's environmental stress and
overpopulation have played a key role, if not the key
role, in causing the civil war. Diamond offers no
elaboration on Nepal, but does say a little more about
his thinking: "Today, just as in the past, countries
that are environmentally stressed, overpopulated, or
both are at risk of becoming politically stressed, and
of seeing their governments collapse. When people
are desperate and undernourished,
they blame their

government, which they see as responsible for failing
to solve their problems. They try to emigrate at any
cost. They start civil wars" (Diamond 2003).
Diamond's vague language leaves him wiggle room
to avoid seeming an extremist-if
overpopulation is
only one of many factors, then he can claim he's not
a demographic determinist. But his tone contradicts
his language.
He sure seems to be saying that
overpopulation causes environmental damage and
civil war. End of story. After all, he doesn't point to
any other possible explanations, or even mention the
possibility of other factors
Diamond's interpretation strikes me as monocausal
and overly simple.
Although
environmental
degradation certainly plays some role in the origins of
Nepal's strife and certainly demographic factors play
some role in environmental damage, just as certainly
other factors are equally important, if not more so.
Poverty, for instance, causes high population and
environmental
degradation as much as it results
from them. And what about the other causes of
Nepal's problems:
class and caste exploitation, a
government that pilfers more than it provides, and
the across-the-board failure of politicalleaders7
For anyone familiar with the American
environmental movement of the 1960s and 1970s,
Diamond's
reductive Malthusianism
is not so
surprising.
Concern about population growth,
especially the high populations of South Asia, formed
a crucial part of the late 1960s and 1970s explosion of
environmental awareness. Sometimes this concern
took moderate forms-conceptualizing
population
growth, especially rapid population growth, as one
of many factors-and
called for measures a great
number of Americans believed in, such as access to
birth control and abortion rights. But sometimes
it appeared a single-minded obsession that made
human society seem as easy to comprehend as cells
in a Petri dish and, in doing so, overlooked as much

as it revealed. To be fair, the Malthusians of the late 1970s
were often responding to extremists on the other side-piein-the-sky techno optimists who acted as if human beings
faced no natural limits-but
that doesn't make their positions
correct.
Diamond's Malthusian interpretation
of Nepal would
not have interested me so much if not for several similar
interpretations I heard while in Nepal during the summer
of 2004. What struck me about these comments was that
they came not from Westerners steeped in the postwar
environmental thought but from Nepalis themselves.
ANECDOTES

FROM NEPAL:

NEPALI

MALTHUSIANISM?

When I was in Nepal in 2004, I returned to the place where
I lived and worked as a teacher trainer for three years in
the mid-1990s and where I've visited every two years since:
Khotang District, a middle-hills district in the East between
Solukhumbu
and Udayapur, Okhladunga,
and Bhojpur.
During this trip, the main conversation topics were the Maoist
conflict, of course, and Nepal's problems of development, a
perennial question.
At two different moments during these conversations two
different Rai friends made comments about how Nepal's
population growth had led to the war. In fact, they both
mentioned Thomas Malthus. Neither person knew much if
anything about my research interests, so they were not trying
to pander to my interests. There was no reason not to take
their comments at face value.
These references to Malthus surprised me. Diamond's view
can be seen as those of an outsider misreading the realities
of the third world. Yet here were Nepalis-indeed,
village
Nepalis-voicing
many of the same arguments.
How should we make sense of the appearance of
Malthusianism among my Nepali friends? Was Diamond
right-was
this confirmation
of Diamond's
approach?
Or was Malthusianism
wrong no matter who made the
argument? This is what I ultimately concluded on the matter.
An interpretation should be assessed not based on where
it originates or who makes that argument-although
these
are not unimportant facts-but
on how well it explains the
evidence.
Nonetheless the origins question is still fascinating. Where
did the Malthusian thinking of my friends originate? That
they referred specifically to Malthus suggests a complicated
history.
I wondered whether Malthusian thinking had
somehow migrated from the West to Nepal and become
indigenized.
Two routes for doing so occurred to me: via
the British in colonial India and their Indian heirs, or via
Americans and other Westerners who worked in and wrote
about Nepal in the decades after World War II.
The latter seems the most likely.
Nepal embraced
international development just at the time when Malthusianism
came to dominate thinking about international development.
Indeed, both of the Nepalis who made these comments were

"developed" by conventional Nepali standards:
one was
a high school teacher, the other worked for a local NGO.
Unfortunately I didn't take the time to quiz either of them
on these comments to really get a sense of what they believed
about population growth and poverty and how these ideas fit
in with other ideas.
AMERICAN

POSTWAR

MALTHUSIANISM

AND SOUTH

ASIA

A little background on American Malthusianism
will
help show how it could have influenced my Rai friends.
Until World War II, Malthusian thinking had never really
gained much of a foothold in the U.S. That began to
change in the 1940s because of two things:
first, some
conservationists attributed the Depression and World War II
to overpopulation, and second, following the war, they began
to see the conditions for renewed war all over the planet. At
first this concern related to parts of southern and eastern
Europe, but eventually it was associated with areas coming to
be known as the "third world." By spreading western medical
practices, disease control, and ideas of consumption-based
economic growth in programs such as Truman's Point IV,
these conservationists argued, the architects of the new world
order were sowing the environmental seeds of future wars.
The logiC of these conservationists-that
population growth
creates environmental damage which creates poverty which
creates political instability which creates war-found
echoes
in Jared Diamond's approach to Nepal (Osborn 1948, Vogt
1948, Perkins 1997).
Malthusian concerns grew in importance in the U.S. in the
1950s and 1960s as the Cold War became increasingly centered
on the third world and places like India. Malthusians would
argue that all the attention given India was because India
had the worst problem of overpopulation,
environmental
degradation, and poverty. But Americans also worried about
India's population because of Cold War concerns-India
was a key Cold War prize because of its strategic location,
its mineral wealth, and its prestige among the decolonizing
world. It was one of the dominoes whose fall, it was believed,
could bring ruin to America's doorstep (Caldwell and Caldwell
1986, Greene 1999, Ross 1998)
When a famine struck India in 1966 and 1967, the U.S.
government
reversed years of skittishness
and added
population
control
to its repertoire
of international
development programs.
India's famine, one historian of
population
politics has written, became "the triggering
event that moved Washington" toward population planning
(Piotrow 1973: 112). These programs grew tremendously:
they became a key part of the "basic needs" approach to
development and they continue to be a large part of American
development aid, including to Nepal (Critchlow 1999).
Appearing in the crucial years after Rachel Carson's Silent
Spring (962) and before the first Earth Day in 1970, the Indian
tragedy left a profound mark not only on America's Cold War
strategists and humanitarians,
but also on a diverse group
coming to be known as "environmentalists."
A surprising

number of these activists had personal connections to India,
including Lester Brown, future founder of the Worldwatch
Institute; Paul Ehrlich, author ofThe Population Bomb (1968),
one of the classic texts of the environmental
movement;
Garrett Hardin, author of "The Tragedy of the Commons"
and "Lifeboat Ethics"; and future Zero Population Growth
(ZPG) and Sierra Club director Carl Pope, who served as a
Peace Corps Volunteer in India during the late 1960s1 To
these environmentalists,
India showed that environmental
catastrophe was imminent; it hammered home the do-or-die
need to see human society through an ecological lens. India, to
them, was the leading edge of the environmental apocalypse.
The guiding mission of many American environmentalists,
one scholarly observer put it at the time, was "No more India's"
(Fleming 1972: 52). "The problems of Delhi and Calcutta are
our problems too," Ehrlich wrote in The Population Bomb,
which was essentially a primer on the Indian famine, "We
must all learn to identify with the plight of our less fortunate
fellows on Spaceship Earth if we are to help both them and
ourselves to survive" (Ehrlich: 2).
During the 1970s and 1980s, critics on both the right and
left, including other environmentalists, attacked the reductive
focus on population by environmentalists
such as Ehrlich.
Many human decisions had led to the famine in India, they
argued, including Nehru's emphasis on industrial development
to the expense of agricultural development, and U.S. surplus
grain exports, which had undercut
India agricultural
programs (Bhatia 1963 and 1991). Other powerful critiques
were also leveled at environmentalists.
Frances Moore Lappe
and Amartya Sen pointed out that social inequities explained
famines better than overpopulation (Lappe and Collins 1977,
and Sen 1981). Feminists like Linda Gordon pointed out
that the population control measures that environmentalists
called for meant giving the U.S. government unprecedented
power over the bodies of some of the most marginalized
people on the planet (Gordon 1976, Hodgson and Watkins
1997). Though no doubt population growth was a source
of concern, it seemed that Cold War political myopia had
created a type of environmentalism narrow in diagnosis and
overly authoritarian in remedy.
Did this concern with population shape Western views and
policy toward Nepal' It seems clear that the answer is yes.
Caste may have been the traditional filter that Westerners
used to understand South Asia society historically, but during
the I960s and I970s population and environment became a
new filter.
SOCIAL

SCIENTIFIC

IMBALANCES

VIEWS

OF ENVIRONMENT/POPULATION

IN NEPAL

During the late 1960s, environmental issues became an
important part of anthropological concerns, and within this
new focus on environmental issues, demographic issues grew
in importance. More so than ever before, researchers began to
focus on how many developing societies were out of balance
demographically.
An example in the Nepal context is Alan

MacFarlane's 1976 ethnography of the Gurungs, Resources
and Population. MacFarlane opened his book with a quotation
from Paul Ehrlich. On the next page, he writes, "We are
rapidly moving towards a population catastrophe which will
make past plagues and two world wars seem insignificant by
comparison" (MacFarlane 1976).
MacFarlane's otherwise careful study shows both the
power and some of the pitfalls of demographic analysis. By
focusing on population, MacFarlane made an important
advance to earlier models:
instead of focusing on
equilibrium, as Roy Rappaport and other anthropologists
had, he stressed historical change.
Through population,
he incorporated history into the study of the Gurungs. At
the time, few other anthropologists incorporated historical
change into their social models. Moreover, MacFarlane was
not unsophisticated about his approach to population.
He
stressed that population growth was not an independent
variable-that
is, he noted that social and economic factors,
not just biological factors, contributed to population growth
rates. But he was less sophisticated about his understanding
of poverty and environmental problems, which he blamed on
overpopulation.
He did not see how other socio-economic
factors, such as poor government or social exploitation, had
contributed. And he did not see how, at least in some cases,
a large family could be a buffer against poverty.
MacFarlane was hardly alone in this thinking.
During
the 1970s, many scholars and development workers came to
believe that the Himalayas, especially the Nepal Himalaya,
faced a profound environmental crisis because of deforestation
caused by overpopulation.
The view became so common
that it eventually earned a name-the
"Himalayan crisis
scenario
In retrospect, these concerns have been shown to be
exaggerated. As Jack Ives, Bruno Messerli, and allies such
as Piers Blaikie have pointed out, deforestation and other
forms of environmental degradation were not as widespread
as believed. Moreover, they note, even where degradation did
exist, overpopulation has not been the chief cause. Ives even
hints that the longeVity of the Himalayan crisis scenario can
be blamed on the development industry's need for justification
and the ease with which they can blame peasant farmers (Ives
2004)
In a useful 1991 article, John Metz summarized many of
the flaws with Malthusian approaches to Nepal. Taking issue
with the idea of peasant population growth as the cause of
deforestation, Metz noted that most deforestation happened
before Nepal's population growth accelerated and that tax
incentives and state policies of jagir and birta were far more
important causes. He also pointed out that mountain farmers
have been unfairly maligned: instead of being destructive
forces driven by biology and unaware of environmental
problems, farmers have traditions of stewardship that work
and they adapt to changing conditions in positive ways.
Metz also stressed that observers have misunderstood the
relationship between population growth and poverty: Poverty

often causes population growth, he said, not the other way
around (Metz 1991).
What effects have these critiques had? It seems clear that the
shift from a demonization of peasant farmers to a celebration
of their local knowledge is at least part of what has driven
the move to community-based natural resource management
programs, at least for many of the outside experts and donors.
(See the accompanying papers in this issue.) But, as the
comments by my Nepali friends demonstrate, Malthusianism
still lives on in Nepal. Moreover, it seems hard to believe that
this is in no way related the pervasiveness and longevity of
the Himalayan crisis scenario among development workers,
both American and Nepali, in Nepal. Indeed, a brief look
at the history suggests that American development agencies
in Nepal, especially USAlD, have played a key role in the
development of concern about population growth among
Nepalis.

This story begins in the mid 1960s. In a later interview,
Joseph Toner, the director ofUSAlD from 1964 to 1966 recalled
that, although he wanted to focus on family planning, Nepali
government officials "had no interest." He didn't elaborate
but he did point out that, at the time, Washington also lacked
a serious commitment to the issue. In truth, Washington was
not against a very modest plan, but they didn't really push it.
In the wake of the famine in India, though, American policy
changed: a 1967 law vastly expanded USAlD's population
planning program in Nepal. With this help, the Nepali
government program expanded its family planning programs,
but, USAlD reported, their interest remained tepid. At the
time, many Nepalis thought that a high population growth
rate was desirable, especially to counterbalance India (Skerry
et al. 2001: 124).
During the early 1970s, USAlD tried to drum up more
support among high-level government officials through a
series of trainings and seminars. One of these, which included
environmental leader Lester Brown and the economist Stephen
Enke, was attended by Harka Gurung, Tulsi Giri, Yadav Pant,
and Pashupati Jang Bahadur Rana. These meetings resulted
in the formation in 1975 of POPCOB, the Population Policies
Coordination Board, with USAlD funding. By the late 1970s,
USAlD's efforts paid off. The Fifth Five-Year Plan made
population planning one of its top priorities and called for
a vast expansion of programs. Concern about population
growth has existed ever since.
During these discussions in the early 1970s, American
consultants and Nepali political officials even considered
compulsory population control measures.
In one 1970
seminar, for instance, G.P. Lohani argued that "Living and
working patterns will have to be altered." Lohani continued,
"The concept of mass indoctrination
will also have to be
accepted and applied to some extent. Many of the vague,
liberal values adopted by the thin crust of the elite section of
the population will have to be abandoned or modified." An

American identified in the record as Dr. Beyer echoed this
sentiment, suggesting that "the Western notion of individual
and family oriented population control might not be valid in
Nepal. Perhaps the decision of the individual about family size
is related to the opinions of others in the community" (CEDA
1971: 53 and 25). Among these elites, there was no strong
argument that compulsory population control might be an
unacceptable infringement of individual rights. This was, of
course, several years before Indira Gandhi's experimentation
with forced sterilization in India during the "emergency"2
During the 1970s and 1980s, many American environmental
workers routinely Singled out population growth for Nepal's
problems. In 1985, for instance, two Americans development
workers blamed deforestation on population: "The rapid
reduction in forest cover that has accompanied the pressures
of an expanding population on the land base has resulted
not only in growing shortages in such important inputs to
the household and rural economy, but also in widespread soil
erosion, flooding and damage to the land base" (Arnold 1985:
I). A 1990 assessment of USAID's natural resource policy also
Singles out population growth as the main culprit:
First, like in many low-income developing countries, the
degradation of Nepal's natural resources is closely tied to
unrelenting pressure exerted on limited arable land by a
large and rapidly growing population, almost 90 percent of
whom depend solely on agriculture for their livelihood. Over
the past three decades, Nepal's high population growth rate
has consistently outpaced the growth of the agricultural
sector. Population growth has also resulted in the expansion
of agricultural
activities into marginally
arable lands,
causing rapid resource depletion and related environmental
degradation. Therefore, any long-term effort to improve the
management of Nepal's natural resources must be based
on programs to increase agricultural productivity through
intensified cultivation, rather than through expansion, and to
curb population growth (Chew 1990 I)
Because of this emphaSiS on population growth, it's a
relatively straight line to the inclusion of population control
in both formal and informal education programs related to
health, women's literacy, and environmental awareness.
I
don't know for certain, but I speculate that this helps to explain
why my Nepali friends came to blame Nepal's problems on
Malthusian dynamics.

The USAlD efforts to spread population control and
Malthusian thinking bring up two questions, which I broach
as way of a conclusion. First, would my Nepali friends be
blaming population growth if not for several decades of
American development? On this question, I'm not quite sure
what to say except that there are clear connections. But this

only leads to a second question: does it really matter whether
the origins were American or Nepali, or whether the motives
were for population control, which was normally the case, or
for women's autonomy, which has only recently been the case?
Here, I am. inclined to say both no and yes. No, the origins
of these programs don't matter, especially if concern about
overpopulation leads to programs that give individuals more
control over their reproductive lives and their futures, which
I take to be a good thing. But yes, it does matter, if poverty
and civil war is blamed on overpopulation to the exclusion
of other causes, such as exploitation and government
incompetence.
Here I think that overpopulation too easily
can be an excuse both for American development workers and
for Nepali governmental officials. Blaming overpopulation is
a way to take responsibility out of their hands for ineffective
development and poor governance.

Connelly, Matthew. 2006. "Population Control in India: Prologue
to the Emergency Period." Population and Development Review 32
(4), December, 629-667.
Critchlow,

Donald.

1999. Intended

Consequences:

Abortion, and the Federal Government
York: Oxford.

Diamond, Jared. 2003. "The Last Americans."
June, Vol. 306, Issue 1837.
Ehrlich, Paul. 1971. The Population

Birth Control,

in Modern America. New
Harper's

Magazine,

Bomb. Rev. edition, Rivercity,

MA: Rivercity Press.
Fleming, Donald. 1972. "Roots of the New Conservation

Movement."

Perspectives in American History 6.
Frances Moore Lappe and Joseph Collins, Food First: Beyond the
Myth of Scarcity. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977.
Gordon, Linda 1976 Woman's Body, Woman's Right: Birth Control
in America. New York: Grossman Publishers.
Greene, Ronald Walter. Malthusian Worlds: U.S. Leadership and the

'See Brown 1994; Hardin 1968 and 1974; and Pope 1972. Hardin visited South Asia in November and December, 1970.

Governing of the Population

2For more on the history of coercive population control programs
advocated by many U.S. development workers and Indians in South
Asia, see Connelly 2006.

1243-48

Arnold, ].E.M. and].

G. Campbell,

"Collective Management

of Hill

Forests in Nepal: The Community Forestry Development Project"
Second Draft, 15 April, 1985, Paper Prepared for the Common
Property Resource Management Conference, Annapolis, MD 21-27,
April, 1985. College Park, MD: Land Tenure Center, University of
Maryland.
Bhatia, B.M. 1963. Famines in India: A Study in Some Aspects of the
Economic History of India, 1860-1945 New York: Asia Publishing
House.
Bhatia, B.M. 1991. Famines in India: A Study in Some Aspects of the
Economic History of India, 1860-1990.

Delhi: Konark Publishers.

Brown, Lester, and H. Kane, Full House: Reassessing
Carrying Capacity. New York: Norton.

the Earth's

Hardin,

Garrett.

Hardin, Garrett

Crisis. Boulder: Westview Press.

1968. "Tragedy of the Commons"

Science 162

1974. "Living on a Lifeboat," Bioscience 24, no. lO.

Hodgson,
Dennis
and
Susan
Watkins,
"Feminists
NeoMalthusians:
Past and Present Alliances." Population
Development Review 23 (3) (Sept): 469-523.

and
and

Ives, Jack. 2004. Himalayan Perceptions: Environmental
Change
and the Well-Being of Mountain Peoples. New York: Routledge.
MacFarlane, Alan. 1976. Resources and Population: A Study of the
Gurungs of Nepal. London: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
Metz, John. 1991. "A Reassessment of the Causes and Severity of
Nepal's Environmental Crisis" World Development, Vol. 19, No.7,
805-820
Osborn,

Fairfield.

1948. Our Plundered

Planet. Boston: Little,

Brown and Co.
Perkins, John H. 1997. Geopolitics

and the Green Revolution

Wheat, Genes, and the Cold War. New York: Oxford.
Piotrow, Phyllis. 1973. World Population Crisis:
States Response. New York: Praeger Publishers.

The United

Caldwell,]ohn and Pat Caldwell. 1986. Limiting Population Growth
and the Ford Foundation Contribution. Dover, N.H.: F. Printer.

Pope, Carl 1972. Sahib: An American
New York: Liveright.

Centre for Economic Development and Administration
[CEDA]
1971. Population and Development: Proceedings of the Seminar
"Population
and
Development,"
Kathmandu,
July
28-30.
Kathmandu: CEDA.

Ross, Eric. The Malthus Factor: Poverty, Politics, and Population
in Capitalist Development. London: Zed Books.

Chew, Siew Tuan. 1990. "Natural Resource Management:
AID's
Experience in Nepal" AID Evaluation Occasional Paper No. 41,
Washington: USAID.

Misadventure

in India.

Sen, Amartya. Poverty and Famines: An Essay in Entitlement
Deprivation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981.
Skerry, Christa,].

Isaacson, K. Moran, K. Kalavan, Half-A-Cen-

tury of Development:
The History of U.S. Assistance
1951-2001. Kathmandu: USAID.
Vogt, William.
Associates.

and

1948.

Road to Survival.

to Nepal,

New York: W Sloane

